| Time | Item | Who | Notes |
|---|
| Rationale for Stake Weighting | Lucius Meredith | - Doesn't want a single individual to masquerade as many validators with small staking amounts. Concern that a validator like this would appear like they are doing a lot of work, but in fact are not.
- Validators with economic capacity will have only a certain amount of risk tolerance. They will have multiple machines. We want to lower the total number of machines that are replicas.
- Do we limit the number of seats to a particular shard?
- If an individual masquerades as many more validators because they want to have a larger stake in the network, the shard will appear to have many many more validators than it really does, and new validators will have the impression that there are many more validators than there really are.
- We want to increase the number of players.
|
| Greg's proposal |
| - No block rewards
- No issuance
- Stake weighting
|
| Mechanism of stake weighting |
| - there is some minimum
- what is the advantage to staking more than the minimum
- Higher stake weight, higher score value when scoring blocks - GHOST rule is stake weighted.
|
| Problems |
| - In either situation, how to prevent a whale from coming in and taking over the shard?
- Transaction fees will fluctuate depending on the number of validators. Validators can effect this change in the Phlogiston exchange rate.
|
| Stake Weighting & Sharding |
| - It is in the best interest to validate all the way to the root.
- Wants to have competition across shards - clients can choose to deploy their code across shards and see where costs are the best.
- Clients can offer a reward for speedy execution → Lucius Meredith - would users need a broker to identify which shard is the 'best deal' for the money?
|
| Bonding wait time |
| - Time to traverse the graph + finalization.
- Kyle Butt: believes there should be a rate limit for bonding / unbonding.
|
| Economist | Lucius Meredith | - Georgious has been engaged with the CoOP. Next steps coming soon.
|