Validator Incentives and Casper reference paragraph starting “Unbonding requests are submitted to the network through transactions (deploys).”
Greg says this should not be the case
Kent says this should be the case
Concern for validators is that they would have to wait to retrieve bond and wait to rebond and have undesired down-time.
RISK validators need a way to calculate a rate of return to be interested in participating
What happens if no one wants to rotate out?
IDEA have a policy decision where the coop enforces via platform governance policy to enforce rotation after an 18 month period (Greg)
IDEA after 18 months the coop pays a validator out of band to rotate out (Kent)
QUESTION Can we use a blockchain paradigm to incentivize validators to rotate? (Chris)
Mitigates the risk (psychological) of validators worrying they won’t make revenue in a scenario where rotation is out of their control
Doesn’t mitigate the risk of deep-pocketed validators not wanting (having enough incentive) to rotate
IDEA fluctuation of the market is adequate to ensure rotation (Greg)
QUESTION is there a mechanism to prevent a single validator (entity) from running multiple validating nodes and spread their stake?
We need to come up with an incentivization that assures good rotation that mitigates the risk of oligarchy AND one that doesn’t dissuade validators from participating related to not being about to control or calculate their participation/return.
QUESTION Can I make a partial unbonding? (Ned)
OPTION A We will enforce rotation based on a set transaction volume. When validators reach the threshold they become eligible for rotation randomly per the protocol
OPTION B We will not enforce validator rotation via the protocol. We will rely on economic incentives to ensure rotation. To mitigate concern for would-be validators waiting to bond is to notify them of a block height to allow them time to secure infrastructure.
DECISION Move forward with Option B and continue to think through this.