Background
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Validators will be paid via Transactions fees primarily (see analysis above). Within a given shard, the transaction fees will be pooled into a single pool and divided among the validators. How these will be divided is still TBD
- Medha Parlikar (Unlicensed): The interval on which the fees are paid out is a parameter.
Jira Legacy server System JIRA serverId 50130123-f232-3df4-bccb-c16e7d83cd3e key RHOL-695 - When a validator unbonds from a shard, fees are paid out. - After clearing the unbonding wait period.
- Medha Parlikar (Unlicensed): Determine what happens when a new validator bonds.
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Policy Set by CoOperative: Fees paid out to validators are inflationary. There is an issuance goes down over a period of 10 years over a logarithmic curve. Over the 10 year period we max out of 10% of the original volume. Decided in April of 2017.
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Provide a mechanism where validators inject a slashable offence, and are given a 'cryptographic coupon' which they provide to the slashing validator, such that their stake is not slashed. The validator reporting the slash is paid a reward from minted tokens.
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Medha Parlikar (Unlicensed): Need to figure out what happens if the offence is not caught. Are all the other validators slashed in that event? Former user (Deleted) -
Medha Parlikar (Unlicensed): Confirm that once the coupon is presented, the slashing condition is orphaned from the state and blockchain. -
Medha Parlikar (Unlicensed): The purpose of this exercise is to catch the 'lazy validator'. In a pool of many validators, it seems that there needs to be a notion of 'Validator X has not slashed in the past Y instances'.-
Medha Parlikar (Unlicensed): Implement an algorithm Statistical probability that 'validator X' is lazy - and then slash & eject validator X?
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Medha Parlikar (Unlicensed): The slash reward will need to be set high enough that slashing is 'worth it'?
Seniorage
Pay out minted Rev as Interest payments on the bound amount. This is paid out irrespective of the number of blocks proposed. Amount paid out is a fixed percentage of the total bond amount? This helps to avoid centralization. Interest is paid out based on a formula that looks something like this:
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| Name | Description | Action | Bond amount affected | Notes | ||||||||
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| Equivocation / Justification Regression | Slash | |||||||||||
| Making Invalid blocks | Slash | |||||||||||
| Accusation | Harder to prove, negative sum game. Accuser(s) accept a slash to grief someone. If proven, the accused is slashed. Ideally a coalition can be formed to knock out a validator that is behaving badly. The coalition all agrees to take a hit in order to get it done. | Slash | ||||||||||
| Empty block proposal | Cannot issue NoOp blocks:
| Eject | 0 |
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| No block proposal | This is handled in protocol and via RHOL-695 . It is not possible to get payments for validation without replaying all blocks. | Eject | 0 |
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